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Brexit negotiations were always going to be incredibly tough given the complexity of 
issues and the deep political divides among UK citizens in the wake of the EU 
referendum. Theresa May's government compounded these challenges with a poorly 
executed negotiation strategy: the UK government embarked on negotiations with 
other EU countries without a clear set of negotiating objectives; it was unable to 
represent itself as a unified negotiating team; it often found itself on the back foot, 
responding to EU proposals on both sequencing and content; and UK politicians 
pursued an ill-judged strategy that did not reflect the nature of the underlying 
negotiating problem or the UK's relative power position. These weaknesses were the 
result of ongoing political divides within the UK cabinet, the wider Conservative 
Party, and UK Parliament. Domestic divisions impeded negotiations with the EU and 
ultimately led to the rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement by the UK Parliament. 
The Brexit negotiations are a powerful illustration of how failure by a government to 
effectively navigate domestic politics can derail international negotiations.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
At the outset of Brexit negotiations, UK prime minister Theresa May said 
she wanted Britain to be a 'great, global trading nation that is respected 
around the world and strong, confident and united at home'.1 Yet the Brexit 
negotiations have damaged the UK government's international reputation 
and precipitated a political and constitutional crisis at home. Why did this 
happen?  
During the Brexit negotiations, the UK government needed to negotiate 
effectively on two levels: internationally to secure a deal with the EU, and 
 
1 Theresa May, 'The Government's Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM 
Speech' (17 January 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-
governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech> accessed 15 
October 2019.  





domestically to ensure that any deal would be ratified by the UK Parliament.2 
Brexit negotiations were always going to be incredibly tough given the 
complexity of issues and the deep political divides among UK citizens in the 
wake of the EU referendum. Theresa May's government compounded these 
challenges with a poorly executed negotiation strategy. I identify specific 
weaknesses in the UK's strategy towards the EU: the UK government 
embarked on negotiations with other EU countries without a clear set of 
negotiating objectives; it was unable to represent itself as a unified 
negotiating team; it often found itself on the back foot, responding to EU 
proposals on both sequencing and content; and UK politicians pursued an ill-
judged distributive strategy that did not reflect the nature of the underlying 
negotiating problem or the UK's relative power position.3  
Weaknesses in the UK strategy stemmed from continuing political divisions 
at home.  The failure of the UK cabinet to agree a common position resulted 
in the UK negotiating without a clear set of objectives and a lack of political 
direction generated tensions within the UK negotiating team. In turn, this 
enabled the EU to seize the initiative in the negotiations and decisively shape 
the outcome. Despite the role of the UK Parliament as a veto player in 
ratification of any Brexit deal, the May government marginalised MPs rather 
than seeking to build alliances across party lines, resulting in the negotiation 
of an agreement with the EU that was rejected by the UK Parliament.  
The Brexit negotiations are a powerful illustration of how failure to 
effectively navigate domestic politics can lead to 'involuntary defection', 
where the government is unable to secure domestic ratification of the deal it 
has negotiated at the international level.4 Scholars have shown that it is 
surprisingly common for international negotiations to be derailed by 
 
2 On international negotiations as two-level games see Robert D Putnam, 
'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games' (1988) 42 
International Organization 427. 
3 Negotiation theory commonly distinguishes between distributive approaches 
which are used to resolve pure conflicts of interest, and integrative approaches 
where the aim is to find common or complementary interests and solve problems 
confronting both parties. See Richard E Walton and Robert B McKersie, A 
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (2nd 
ed, ILR Press 1991). 
4 Putnam (n 2). 
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governments misreading their own domestic politics, rather than 
disagreements with their international counterparts.5 In the Brexit 
negotiations, weaknesses in the UK government's strategy did not arise from 
insufficient information about the nature of domestic politics or opposition 
from powerful interest groups, but rather from the challenges of forging a 
cross-party coalition in the context of a majoritarian parliamentary system. 
This article is organised chronologically, starting in the aftermath of the EU 
referendum in June 2016 and ending when Theresa May stepped down as 
Prime Minister in June 2019. Section 2 provides a brief reminder of the 
challenging context in which Theresa May's government found itself straight 
after the EU referendum. Section 3 examines the moves made by the UK and 
EU27 as they prepared for formal negotiations. Sections 4 and 5 analyse the 
first phase and second phase of formal negotiations, while Section 6 examines 
the politics of domestic ratification in the UK. It concludes with a brief 
reflection on the UK government's strategy and lessons for future 
negotiations. 
The article draws on a range of publicly available sources including 
parliamentary reports, government documents, and newspaper articles, and 
insights from political science and negotiation studies.  
II. STARTING POINT: THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WEREN'T MEANT TO 
HAPPEN 
Theresa May took the helm of the UK government in July 2016, days after a 
referendum in which a majority narrowly voted for the UK to leave the 
European Union.6 In many ways Theresa May was an unlikely Prime 
Minister. She was not seen as an obvious leadership candidate within or 
outside the Conservative Party, was known for being technocratic and had a 
 
5 See for instance Peter B Evans, 'Conclusion: Building an Integrative Approach' in 
Peter B Evans, Harold K Jacobson and Robert D Putnam (eds), International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-Edged Diplomacy (University of California 
Press 1993). 
6 See Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 
2017).  





low profile.7 Theresa May's refusal to take sides during the EU referendum 
campaign propelled her into the leadership position, almost by default. She 
was the 'last one standing' when it came to electing a new Conservative Party 
leader.8 
The referendum outcome was a profound shock to the country's political and 
economic leadership. Theresa May inherited a civil service completely 
unprepared to deliver on the 'biggest and most complex task in its peacetime 
history'.9 David Cameron, Theresa May's predecessor, had been so confident 
that the government would win the referendum that he famously told the 
civil service not to prepare for a 'leave' outcome, a decision that the UK's 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee later concluded was an 'act of gross 
negligence'.10  
Theresa May also faced a bitterly divided Conservative Party. The UK's 
relationship with the EU has been a perennial challenge for Conservative 
Party leaders and disputes over UK relations with Europe ultimately cost 
Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and David Cameron their premierships.11 
Following the EU referendum campaign, rifts ran deep, with rival factions in 
 
7 Sam Knight, 'Theresa May's Impossible Choice' The New Yorker (30 July 2018) 
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/30/theresa-mays-impossible-
choice> accessed 15 October 2019 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jeremy Heywood, 'How the Civil Service Is Preparing for Brexit' (Civil Service 
Blog, 11 July 2017) <https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2017/07/11/how-the-civil-
service-is-preparing-for-brexit/> accessed 15 October 2019; see also Joe Owen, 
Lewis Lloyd and Jill Rutter, 'Preparing Brexit: How Ready Is Whitehall?' (Institute 
for Government 2018) <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default 
/files/publications/IFGJ6279-Preparing-Brexit-Whitehall-Report-180607-
FINAL-3c.pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
10 Foreign Affairs Committee, 'Equipping the Government for Brexit' (Parliament, 20 
July 2016) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/431/ 
43106.htm> accessed 15 October 2019. 
11 Andrew Grice, 'Europe Killed the Careers of the Last Three Conservative PMs – 
and Now It's Set to Destroy Theresa May' The Independent (12 July 2016) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/europe-killed-the-careers-of-the-last-
three-conservative-pms-and-now-its-set-to-destroy-theresa-may-a7132651.html> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
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the Conservative Party advocating radically different visions of the type of 
Brexit that the UK should pursue.  
As has been exhaustively analysed elsewhere, there were a variety of options 
for structuring future UK-EU trade relations, ranging from full or partial 
membership of the single market and customs union (which was quickly 
dubbed 'soft Brexit' in public discussions), which would entail maintaining 
very close economic, legal and political relations, to the negotiation of an 
arms-length free trade agreement or leaving without any agreement at all 
(forms of 'hard Brexit').12 The Eurosceptic faction of the Conservative Party 
sought an arms-length relationship with the EU and advocated for 'hard 
Brexit' while others in the Conservative Party supported 'soft Brexit'. 
Emboldened by the surge of support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
and the victory of the leave campaign in the EU referendum, the Eurosceptic 
faction gained power within the Conservative Party. Theresa May made sure 
Eurosceptics were well represented in Cabinet, allocating them the key 
Brexit portfolios, a decision that proved critical in shaping the course of the 
negotiations. 
The Labour Party, the main opposition party, also faced challenges in the 
wake of the EU referendum. The vast majority of Labour MPs and grassroots 
Labour Party members had supported the remain campaign, but after the EU 
referendum many Labour MPs found themselves representing 
constituencies in which the majority of voters had voted to leave. This 
hampered the Labour Party's ability to forge a unified approach to the Brexit 
negotiations and hold the government to account on its Brexit strategy. 
III. PREPARING TO NEGOTIATE (JULY 2016 - JULY 2017) 
Following the UK's EU referendum in June 2016, the UK and the 27 other 
EU Member States (hereafter 'EU') worked to appoint negotiating teams and 
decide their negotiating objectives. On 29th March 2017 the UK government 
wrote to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, to formally notify 
him of the UK's intention to leave, thereby triggering Article 50 of the Treaty 
 
12 See Giorgio Sacerdoti, 'The Prospects: The UK Trade Regime with the EU and the 
World: Options and Constraints Post-Brexit' in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & 
Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017). 





on European Union (TEU) and starting the clock on the two-year period that 
the Treaty set out for the parties to agree the terms of withdrawal and nature 
of the future relationship.13 
Given the scope of the issues to be negotiated, three agreements needed to 
be reached. First, agreement on the terms of the UK's withdrawal or 
'divorce', covering immediate issues such as: the rights of EU citizens living 
in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU; financial liabilities, including UK 
contributions to the EU budget cycle for 2014-2020 and pension 
contributions; and the relocation of EU institutions based in the UK. 
Second, a new UK-EU relationship would need to be agreed, including on the 
access the UK and EU would have to each other's markets; the extent to 
which the UK would adhere to EU laws and have influence over EU rules and 
regulations; UK participation in EU research programmes; and the nature of 
security and defence cooperation.  
While Article 50 TEU required the UK and EU27 to reach agreement on the 
framework for future relations, an agreement on a future relationship 
between the UK and EU27 could only be finalised and concluded once the 
UK had become a third country.14 As a result, a third agreement would also 
be needed to govern the transition period between the point of the UK's exit 
(two years after the triggering of Article 50) and the point at which a new UK-
EU relationship had been concluded, which was likely to be several years 
later. 
1. The UK's Ambiguous Negotiating Objectives 
Initially the UK government appeared to have a coherent set of negotiating 
objectives focused on delivering a 'hard Brexit' agreement. Within days of 
assuming office, Theresa May announced her Cabinet, choosing to put three 
staunch leave-supporting politicians at the helm of the Brexit negotiations: 
Boris Johnson was appointed Foreign Secretary; David Davis was appointed 
to the new role of Secretary of State for Exiting the EU; and Liam Fox was 
 
13 Theresa May, 'Prime Minister's Letter to European Council President Donald 
Tusk' (29 March 2017) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to
_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
14 See Armstrong in this issue.  
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appointed to the post of Secretary of State for International Trade. To 
accompany these posts, the government announced the creation of two new 
ministries, the Department for Exiting the EU (DexEU) and Department for 
International Trade (DIT). In appointing a Secretary of Trade and investing 
considerable resources in a new trade ministry, the government signalled that 
it was prioritising the autonomy of future UK trade policy, an objective that 
aligned with the UK's exit from the EU customs union and single market.  
Early signs that the UK government would pursue a 'hard Brexit' policy were 
reinforced by a series of high-profile public speeches in which Theresa May 
set out the government's negotiating objectives. In her speech at the 
Conservative Party conference in October 2016, Theresa May emphasised 
that the 'authority of EU law' in Britain, including the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), would be 'ended forever', and promised UK 
control over immigration from the EU.15 She also promised to trigger Article 
50 and embark on formal negotiations no later than the end of March 2017.16 
Meanwhile, Liam Fox, the newly appointed Secretary of State for Trade, set 
out a vision for negotiating free trade agreements around the world.17 The 
stage looked set for the UK negotiating a deal that would result in an arms-
length relationship with the rest of the EU, based on a free trade agreement.  
Yet, as time went on, the UK's position became more ambiguous. The White 
Paper in February 2017 explicitly stated that the UK would leave the EU 
single market and would pursue 'an ambitious and comprehensive free trade 
agreement', but it also stated that it would pursue a 'new customs agreement' 
with the EU and that a future agreement might 'take in elements of current 
single market arrangements in certain areas'.18 This introduced 
 
15 Theresa May, 'Theresa May's Keynote Speech at Conservative Party Conference 
October 2016' The Independent (5 October 2016) <https://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcript-
a7346171.html> accessed 15 October 2019. 
16 Ibid. 
17 E.g. Jon Stone, 'TTIP Trade Deal Might Never Happen, Trade Secretary Liam Fox 
Says' The Independent (8 September 2016) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news 
/uk/politics/ttip-liam-fox-uk-british-never-happen-stop-international-trade-
brexit-a7231786.html> accessed 15 October 2019. 
18 HM Government White Paper, 'The United Kingdom's Exit from, and New 
Partnership with, the European Union' paras 8.1–3 





contradictions in the heart of the UK's negotiating position, as any customs 
union agreement that enabled the free circulation of goods would require a 
harmonised external tariff, which would inevitably curtail the UK's ability to 
strike free trade agreements with third countries. Meanwhile, incorporating 
elements of the single market would result in some continued jurisdiction of 
the ECJ, or an equivalent body, in the UK, breaching one of the red lines 
Theresa May had set out in her party conference speech.  
In retrospect it is remarkable how little attention was paid to the 
implications of Brexit for peace in Northern Ireland in the EU referendum 
campaign and first months of Theresa May's government. It was only in a 
Brexit White Paper (February 2017) and in the letter triggering Article 50 
(March 2017) that the UK government started to grapple with the question 
of how its proposals would affect the border between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland, and its commitments under the Good Friday 
Agreement. The White Paper recognised the need to 'find a practical 
solution that keeps the border as seamless and frictionless as possible, 
recognising the unique economic, social, and political context'.19 The Article 
50 letter stated that the UK wanted to 'avoid a return to a hard border'.20 Yet 
this objective was hard to reconcile with the UK's stated ambition of leaving 
the single market and customs union, both of which implied the introduction 
of physical checks at the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland.21 
Thus, even before any formal engagement with the EU, contractions and 
ambiguities in the UK negotiating position were becoming apparent. The 
decision to trigger Article 50 and launch formal negotiations before agreeing 





15 October 2019. 
19 Ibid 8.49. 
20 May, 'Prime Minister's Letter to European Council President Donald Tusek (n 14). 
21 On the tensions in the UK position see Emily Jones and Calum Miller, 'The Brexit 
Impossibility Triangle' [2019] Project Syndicate <https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/brexit-impossibility-triangle-by-emily-jones-and-
calum-miller-2019-04> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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UK to table unrealistic negotiating proposals, including a proposal for the 
UK to have a customs arrangement with the EU that would ensure 
frictionless trade and avoid a hard border with Ireland, while also leaving the 
EU customs union in order to have a fully sovereign trade policy. This 
proposal was dubbed a 'Schroedinger's Customs Union' by Ivan Rogers, the 
UK's former Permanent Representative to the EU, as it was hard to conceive 
how such an arrangement would work in practice.22  
2. The EU's Clear Negotiating Objectives and Agenda-Setting Moves  
While the UK tied itself in knots, the EU developed its own negotiating 
guidelines23 and directives.24 The EU and UK positions shared common 
elements, including the desire to safeguard the rights of citizens and provide 
clarity and legal certainty, but there were major differences. The EU insisted 
that the four 'fundamental freedoms' of the EU single market were 
indivisible, which meant that agreeing to free movement of goods, services, 
and capital would necessarily entail accepting freedom of movement of 
people too, a red line for the UK. The EU explicitly excluded the possibility 
of a sector-by-sector approach to participation in the single market, in direct 
opposition to the UK's desire to 'take in elements of the single market'.25 The 
EU insisted that any future free trade agreement must 'ensure a level playing 
field' to safeguard against any moves the UK might make to lower regulatory 
standards in areas such as tax and social and environmental standards.26  
 
22 Ivan Rogers, 'Sir Ivan Rogers' Speech on Brexit' (13 December 2018) 
<https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2018/12/13/full-speech-sir-ivan-rogers-on-brexit/> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
23 European Council, 'European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines for Brexit 
Negotiations' <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/ 
29/euco-brexit-guidelines/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
24 Council of the European Union, 'Directives for the Negotiation of an Agreement 
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Setting out the 
Arrangements for Its Withdrawal from the European Union' <https://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-
ad01re02en17.pdf> accessed 15 October 2019. 
25 European Council, 'European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines for Brexit 
Negotiations' (n 24) pt 1.1. 
26 European Council, 'European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines for Brexit 
Negotiations' (n 24) pt 1.1. 





The EU also set out a series of stipulations about the negotiating process. The 
EU Member States would speak with one voice and, to ward off any attempt 
by the UK to try and capitalise on differences among the EU27, the EU 
appointed a European Commission Task Force to conduct the negotiations 
with the UK. It stated that it would engage the UK exclusively through the 
official negotiating channels and there would be 'no separate negotiations' 
between the UK and individual Member States. Crucially, the EU also 
insisted on a two-phase approach to the negotiations,27 structuring 
discussions to its advantage by frontloading the issues on which it wanted to 
secure commitments from the UK, including on citizens' rights, the financial 
settlement, and the Northern Ireland border, before it would negotiate on 
the future trading relationship, which was of particular interest to the UK.  
The EU's proposals on how the negotiations should be sequenced conflicted 
with the UK's proposals. In the letter triggering Article 50, the UK proposed 
that the terms of the future partnership be agreed 'alongside' those of the 
UK's withdrawal from the EU.28 Perhaps in a move to push the UK into 
accepting its preferred structure, the European Commission negotiating 
mandate only covered those issues it wanted to discuss in phase one. This 
meant that if the UK wanted to negotiate issues in a different sequence, the 
European Commission would have had to go back to the Member States to 
obtain authorisation, delaying the start of the formal negotiations.  
3. May's Political Miscalculation Further Muddies the Negotiation 
In the run up to formal negotiations with the European Union, Theresa May 
called a snap general election in a bid to strengthen her negotiating hand. Her 
government was operating with a wafer-thin majority of only 12 MPs in 
Parliament and the prime minister was concerned that such a slim majority 
would enable opposition parties to frustrate the Brexit negotiations. Opinion 
polls showed the Conservative Party had a twenty-point lead over Jeremy 
 
27 Council of the European Union (n 25) pt 3.9. 
28 May, 'Prime Minister's Letter to European Council President Donald Tusk' (n 14) 
4. 
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Corbyn's Labour Party29 and May saw an opportunity to win a much larger 
majority and greater control over Parliament. 
This move backfired spectacularly as Theresa May lost her parliamentary 
majority altogether. The prime minister campaigned badly on a manifesto 
that failed to win public support. She proved herself unable to connect with 
citizens on the campaign trail, appearing robotic and uneasy. Meanwhile 
Jeremy Corbyn ran an effective grassroots campaign. The Conservative Party 
suffered a net loss of 13 seats, producing a hung Parliament. In order to secure 
a working majority in Parliament, Theresa May entered into an alliance with 
the 10 MPs from the socially conservative Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
of Northern Ireland, who supported a 'hard' Brexit. 
The parliamentary arithmetic that resulted from the ill-judged decision to 
call a general election left May with a serious political challenge. She needed 
to deliver a Brexit agreement that worked for the EU and would command 
the support of a majority of MPs in the UK Parliament, yet she did not 
command a majority in Parliament and her own party was bitterly divided. 
There was the option of brokering an agreement with the Labour Party. Had 
cross-party discussions started in earnest at this early stage it is conceivable 
that they would have yielded a set of negotiating objectives and ultimately a 
deal (focused on remaining in a customs union and in the EU single market), 
which would have been supported by a majority of MPs. But reaching out to 
the Labour Party ran the risk of alienating Eurosceptic MPs and splitting the 
Conservative party, a risk Theresa May was not prepared to take. Instead she 
held fast in her determination to deliver a parliamentary majority through 
support from Conservative and DUP MPs. This in turn meant that any deal 
would need to have the support of Conservative MPs who prioritised 
remaining in the customs union and single market as well as of those who 
insisted on the UK gaining 'full sovereignty' in external trade policy. This 
proved to be an impossible task. 
 
29 Sebastian Payne, 'UK General Election: Theresa May Seizes the Moment to Bank 
Poll Lead' FT.com (18 April 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/7ef72c62-2425-11e7-
a34a-538b4cb30025> accessed 15 October 2019 





IV. PHASE I OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS (JUNE 2017 – MARCH 2018) 
Formal negotiations between the UK and EU began in June 2017, eleven days 
after the snap elections and with Theresa May's government weak and 
fragmented. The Department for Exiting the EU, which had responsibility 
for leading the Brexit negotiations, lost two of its four ministers in the wake 
of the elections and there were major divisions within the Cabinet on how to 
approach Brexit. Disagreement at the political level made it hard for civil 
servants to make clear and detailed proposals at the negotiating table.30 A 
photograph from the second day of the formal negotiations captured the 
mood. It was taken at the European Commission's headquarters and showed 
the EU and UK negotiating teams facing each other across a glass table. The 
EU's side had a raft of documents, while the UK team had a single, slender 
notebook among them.31 
1. The UK's (Wrong-Footed) Strategy  
The first issue to be negotiated was the sequencing of the negotiations. David 
Davis, UK Brexit Secretary said, in a widely-quoted media interview, that 
agreeing on the sequence of negotiations would be the 'row of the summer'.32 
The UK would insist that negotiations on the new trade relationship start 
immediately, in direct opposition to the EU's proposal for a two-phase 
schedule that left trade negotiations to the second phase. Yet, despite all the 
 
30 Kylie MacLellan and William James, 'Brexit Negotiations Have Not Begun Well 
for UK, Says Former Top Diplomat' Reuters (7 August 2017) 
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-negotiations/brexit-negotiations-
have-not-begun-well-for-uk-says-former-top-diplomat-idUKKBN1AN12V> 
accessed 15 October 2019.   
31 Thierry Charlier, '"No Notes" Davis Riles Anti-Brexit Camp in Negotiations' 
(Reuters, 17 July 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-notes/no-
notes-davis-riles-anti-brexit-camp-in-negotiations-idUSKBN1A213Z> accessed 15 
October 2019.  
32 Oliver Wright, 'Timetable for Brexit Talks Will Be Row of Summer, Says Davis' 
The Times (15 May 2017) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/timetable-for-brexit-
talks-will-be-row-of-summer-says-davis-zr0nsmrxr> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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bravado, the UK accepted the EU's proposals on the first day of 
negotiations.33 The EU had succeeded in structuring the process in its favour.  
Although Theresa May appointed several remain supporters into her 
Cabinet, including Philip Hammond as Chancellor, her decision to put 
staunch Eurosceptics into pivotal Brexit roles set the UK on course for a 
hard-line, distributive negotiating strategy. Negotiation theory distinguishes 
between distributive negotiation strategies that are designed to resolve pure 
conflicts of interest, and integrative approaches which seek to find common 
or complementary interests and solve problems confronting both parties.34 
The approach adopted by the politicians in charge of the negotiations 
suggests that they perceived the UK and EU as having conflicting interests, 
overlooking the common interests that both parties had in achieving a 
negotiated settlement and minimising economic disruption.35 While passing 
mention was made of shared values and the need to cooperate, the UK's 
leading politicians showed little interest in understanding the interests of EU 
Member States and the constraints within which they had to operate, and 
were not perceived by the EU as trustworthy interlocuters.36 Instead of 
seeking to build trust and a spirit of collaboration to address a complex set of 
challenges faced by both parties, public pronouncements from Theresa May 
and leading ministers focused on classic distributive tactics including tabling 
unrealistic demands and making frequent threats to walk away. 
The EU was framed by the UK's political leaders as being unreasonable and 
demanding a 'punitive deal'. Time and again UK leaders declared that 'no deal 
 
33 Andrew Sparrow, 'UK Appears to Capitulate on Sequencing on First Day of Brexit 
Talks - as It Happened' The Guardian (19 June 2017) <https://www.theguardian. 
com/politics/blog/live/2017/jun/19/boris-johnson-and-gove-both-back-may-as-
tory-leadership-speculation-continues-politics-live> accessed 15 October 2019. 
34 Walton and McKersie (n 3). 
35 A common mistake on the part of untrained negotiators is to assume that parties' 
interests are directly and completely opposed. See Leigh L Thompson, The Mind 
and Heart of the Negotiator (5th ed, Pearson 2012) 94. 
36 See for instance Angelique Chrisafis, Luke Harding and Arthur Neslen, 
'"Outrageous" and "a Liar" – Germany and France Lead Criticism of Boris Johnson' 
(14 July 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/14/french-foreign-
minister-boris-johnson-is-a-liar-with-his-back-against-the-wall> accessed 15 
October 2019. 





was better than a bad deal' and said the UK was prepared to walk away from 
the negotiating table.37 Constant references were made to the costs to EU 
Member States if the UK walked away and frequent pronouncements were 
made about a Global Britain that would be better off without close ties with 
the EU as it would be able to enter into an array of trade deals with other 
countries.38 As Theresa May said in her speech in October 2016,  
Countries including Canada, China, India, Mexico, Singapore and South 
Korea have already told us they would welcome talks on future free trade 
agreements. And we have already agreed to start scoping discussions on trade 
agreements with Australia and New Zealand.39  
Emphasis was placed on strengthening ties to commonwealth countries, a 
vision that civil servants reportedly dubbed 'Empire 2.0'.40 
While a hard-line distributive strategy is useful when negotiating the price of 
a second-hand car, as one party wins what the other party loses, it is rarely 
productive in complex public policy negotiations, where parties typically 
have a mix of complementary and competing interests. Hard-line approaches 
risk antagonising the other party, damaging future relations, and usually fail 
to generate deals that maximise value, even for the stronger party.41 The UK's 
decision to adopt a distributive strategy in Brexit negotiations was 
 
37 See for instance George Parker, 'Theresa May Warns UK Will Walk Away from 
"Bad Deal"' Financial Times (17 January 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/ 
c3741ca2-dcc6-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6> accessed 15 October 2019.  
38 For instance, in a remark designed to capture media headlines, the UK Foreign 
Secretary told his Italian counterpart that Italy would agree to the UK's demands 
as Italy would lose prosecco exports if it didn't. BBC, 'Boris Johnson Attacked over 
"Prosecco Insult"' BBC (16 November 2016) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
37995606> accessed 15 October 2019. 
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The Independent (2 October 2016) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk 
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particularly ironic as the UK was not negotiating from a superior power 
position. While the costs of a no-deal scenario were substantial for both the 
UK and EU, impact assessments showed they were much higher for the UK, 
as the EU Member States were a more important export market for the UK, 
than the UK was for them: while UK exports to the EU were equivalent to 
12.2 per cent of UK GDP, EU exports to the UK were equivalent to only 2.6 
per cent of EU GDP.42 While the threat of walking away with no deal would 
be costly to some EU Member States, notably Ireland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France, 19 of the 27 EU Member States had a 
trade-related exposure to Brexit of less than 2 per cent of GDP. The cost to 
the UK of walking away was further increased by the immense short-term 
uncertainties it would create as many of the rules underpinning the UK's 
economic and regulatory structure would disappear.43 
The UK's frequently invoked alternative options also lacked credibility. A 
trade deal with the United States was often held up as an alternative to the 
EU, but only 18 per cent of UK exports were destined for the US, compared 
with 43 per cent to the EU.44 Moreover, the negotiation of a UK-US trade 
deal would meet strong domestic opposition within the UK. Much touted 
trade relations with all 51 commonwealth countries, including Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and India, only accounted for 9 per cent of UK 
exports.45 Meanwhile, UK attempts to initiate trade talks with third 
countries and invoke these alternative options were rebuffed, as third 
countries wanted to see the outcome of Brexit talks before engaging in 
substantive discussions.46  
 
42 The UK in a Changing Europe, 'Cost of No Deal Revisited' (The UK in a Changing 
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Rather than shore up the UK's negotiation position, the UK's distributive 
moves, coupled with its ambiguous negotiating objectives, undermined its 
credibility as a negotiating partner. The UK was slow to table proposals, 
giving the EU the opportunity to set the agenda and terms of the discussion. 
David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, defended this approach 
explaining that  
At the end, we may well publish an alternative proposal, but at the moment 
the proper approach, to get the right outcome in the negotiation, is to 
challenge what it [the EU] is doing.47  
The UK's failure to table detailed proposals frustrated progress and enabled 
the EU to attribute responsibility to the UK for the lack of progress. As 
Michel Barnier, the EU chief negotiator, stated during the negotiations, 
'clarification of the UK's position is indispensable to negotiate and achieve 
""sufficient progress"" on the settlement.'48  
In several instances the UK declared a strong position publicly, only to back 
down, illustrating the perils of pursuing a distributive strategy when threats 
to walk away lacked credibility. On the issue of financial commitments for 
instance, the UK tried to link negotiations to discussions on future trade 
arrangements, insisting that it would only negotiate its financial 
commitments if the EU agreed to negotiate the future trade agreement in 
parallel. EU negotiators swiftly rebutted this move and the UK acquiesced.49  
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As negotiations got underway, tensions emerged among the UK politicians 
and civil servants on the UK negotiating team. Theresa May's public 
pronouncement in October 2016 that the UK would withdraw from the ECJ 
reportedly astonished senior officials, as there had not been a detailed 
internal discussion or assessment of the implications.50 Similarly, her 
declaration in the same speech that Article 50 would be triggered by the end 
of March 2017 reflected the advice of her political advisers, who argued that 
she needed to be seen by the UK public to be delivering on Brexit, and went 
against the advice of senior civil servants. Senior civil servants were, rightly, 
worried that the UK would give the EU an advantage in the negotiations if 
Article 50 was triggered before the UK government had agreed on what it 
wanted Brexit to look like.51 
Tensions were running so high between politicians and civil servants that, 
even before negotiations began, Ivan Rogers, the UK's permanent 
representative to the EU, resigned because his relationship with Theresa 
May and her team had broken down. In his resignation letter he highlighted 
the risks associated with the UK's lack of clarity in its Brexit negotiating 
objectives, tensions between the UK's team in Brussels and colleagues in 
London, and a lack of serious multilateral negotiating expertise in Whitehall. 
He urged colleagues to 'continue to challenge ill-founded arguments and 
muddled thinking' coming from London.52 Meanwhile splits within the 
cabinet led Theresa May to move Olly Robbins, the UK's chief negotiator, to 
the Prime Minister's Office so that he would report directly to her. This side-
lined David Davis, the ministerial lead for the negotiations, although he 
remained nominally in charge.53 
A serious gap was also emerging between the UK government and 
Parliament, as the government failed to keep Parliament fully briefed on the 
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negotiations. This failure to reach out and build trusted relations in 
Parliament cost the May government dearly when it came to ratification of 
the Withdrawal Agreement. Despite very delicate Parliamentary arithmetic, 
the government made no attempt to forge alliances within Westminster. 
Discussions in Parliament after the first round of negotiations in July 2017 
revealed that the Brexit Secretary had not thought about a mechanism for 
keeping Parliament's EU Select Committee briefed.54 The government failed 
to publish impact assessments on the impact of different Brexit scenarios and 
reports by Parliament's researchers relied on the EU for information about 
what was happening in the negotiating room.55  
2. The EU Strategy: Clarity and Unity 
Given the manifold weaknesses in the UK strategy, it wasn't hard for the 
EU's negotiating strategy to look impressive. The EU was clear about its 
negotiating objectives, which focused on maintaining the integrity of the EU 
project and supporting Ireland in its determination to ensure there would be 
no hard border. Throughout the negotiations the EU negotiators appeared 
to be one step ahead, with the UK largely reacting to EU proposals. 
Although the European Commission faced an unenviable task of negotiating 
Brexit on behalf of 27 Member States, it had decades of experience in leading 
international trade negotiations on behalf of the EU and using its domestic 
constraints as a source of leverage.56 In the Brexit negotiations, the EU 
managed to preserve unity, showing few of the internal tensions that were so 
apparent across the Channel. Michel Barnier was a former French Minister 
who had also served as European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services. He worked hard to keep the leaders of the EU Member States 
aligned and briefed and quickly earned their trust and respect. Unlike their 
 
54 Lang, McGuinness and Miller (n 48) 6. 
55 Sylvia de Mars, 'Brexit: Negotiations Update (March-June 2018),' Research 
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UK counterparts, Barnier's team was delegated substantial autonomy to 
negotiate with the UK and his team of negotiators worked effectively 
together and with their political principals.57 
Although civil servants on the UK and EU negotiating teams formed a 
productive working relationship, relations at the political level were tense 
and became strained, hampering progress. At one stage during the formal 
negotiations, David Davis and his counterpart Michel Barnier spent only four 
hours in face-to-face talks during a six-month period.58 
3. The Joint Report (December 2017)  
After six months of intense negotiations from June to December 2017, the 
UK and EU reached preliminary agreement on phase one of the negotiations, 
issuing a Joint Report in December 2017.59 On citizens' rights, the parties 
reached a 'common understanding' on how to provide reciprocal protection, 
while on the financial settlement they agreed on a methodology for 
calculating the UK's financial obligations.  
The most challenging and fraught negotiations were over the UK's border 
with Ireland. The EU was firm that there would be no hard border on the 
island of Ireland, and the UK government agreed, but this was hard to square 
with the UK government's determination to leave the EU custom's union and 
single market, which implied new border checks. In August 2017 the UK had 
tabled a proposal for a UK-EU customs partnership arrangement under 
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which both parties could have different external tariffs and rules of origin and 
yet have frictionless trade between them.60 Under the UK's proposal, the UK 
would essentially implement two parallel systems at its borders. For goods 
coming into the UK that were destined for the EU, the UK would act on 
behalf of the EU, levying EU tariffs and checking products met EU standards. 
For goods destined for sale in the UK, it would levy UK tariffs and check 
products met UK standards. The UK government acknowledged this would 
need a 'robust enforcement mechanism' and the tracking of goods to ensure 
that they reached their intended destination.61 The UK negotiators also 
proposed measures to streamline customs procedures, the use of technology 
to enable any checks to be carried out virtually, and continued regulatory 
alignment in agricultural products.62 
Unsurprisingly, the UK's complex proposals were met with scepticism by the 
EU and few were persuaded that they were viable. As Ireland's Foreign 
Minister Simon Coveney stated, 
What we do not want to pretend is that we can solve the problems of the 
border on the island of Ireland through technical solutions like cameras and 
pre-registration and so on. That is not going to work.63 
Unable to agree on a detailed solution on the UK-Ireland border, the UK and 
EU agreed on a set of overarching principles that focused on upholding the 
Good Friday Agreement and avoiding any physical infrastructure at the 
border, as well as preserving the integrity of the UK's internal market by 
ensuring that there would be no customs border between Northern Ireland 
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and the rest of the UK. The Joint Report committed the parties to upholding 
these principles 'in all circumstances'.64 These principles were particularly 
contentious for the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party as upholding 
them implied maintaining a very close economic relationship with the EU, 
which threatened to undermine UK sovereignty in external trade policy. 
V. PHASE II OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS (MARCH 2018 – NOVEMBER 
2018) 
Following the end of phase one and the publication of the Joint Report, the 
EU agreed that 'sufficient progress' had been made for the negotiations to 
move to the second phase, which included negotiating a framework for future 
trade relations between the UK and EU. Donald Tusk, President of the 
European Council, warned that agreeing to a deal by the March 2019 deadline 
would be 'dramatically difficult' and that the Phase II would be 'more 
demanding, more challenging than the first phase'.65 
1. The EU Holds the Pen 
Once again, the EU played a decisive role, shaping the trajectory and outcome 
of the negotiations. The European Commission proposed detailed 
negotiating guidelines for phase two of the negotiations, which were 
published by the European Council as negotiating directives in January 
2018.66 These asked the EU team to negotiate a 'standstill' transition period 
where the UK would be outside the EU and no longer participate in or 
nominate or elect members of the EU institutions, but would be bound by 
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the whole of the EU acquis. In line with Article 50, agreement on a future 
relationship would only be finalised and concluded once the UK had left the 
EU, although the EU would be ready to engage in preliminary and 
preparatory discussions with the aim of identifying an overall understanding 
of the framework for the future relationship. This was in direct opposition to 
the UK's proposal to enter into substantive negotiations on a future trade 
agreement during phase two.67 
The EU negotiating directives were drafted to be very specific and to provide 
little room for negotiation. In a move to gain the upper hand in the 
negotiations, the EU codified its detailed negotiating directives, as well as the 
principles that had been agreed in the Joint Report, and tabled them in the 
form of a draft legal text.68 The draft text was circulated by the European 
Commission for internal discussion by its Member States before being 
forwarded to the UK.69 This text was then used as the basis for the 
negotiations: the EU negotiators were holding the pen. 
The UK accepted major aspects of the EU's proposals for the transition 
period and, in doing so, agreed to provisions that crossed many of the red lines 
Theresa May had set out in 2016. Although the UK would have technically 
left the EU, during the 21-month transition period divergence from EU law 
would not be possible and the ECJ would continue to be a binding source of 
authority in the UK, the UK would remain in the EU's customs union and 
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adhere to its trade policies, and free movement of people would continue.70 
The UK agreed to stay in the Common Fisheries Policy with no formal voting 
rights over fishing quotas during the transition period, although it had the 
right to be consulted.71 The UK did manage to secure agreement that it could 
negotiate and sign, although not implement, trade deals with third countries 
during the transition period.  
2. UK Finally Clarifies Its Negotiating Objectives – or Does It? 
Negotiations continued at the technical level in a wide range of areas such as 
protection of data, police and judicial cooperation, and dispute settlement. 
But negotiations about how to operationalise the agreed principles with 
regards to Northern Ireland and on the future of UK-EU relations were 
painfully slow. The EU proposed a 'backstop' in the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement of March 2018 that would uphold the Good Friday Agreement by 
creating a customs and regulatory border down the Irish Sea, something to 
which Theresa May declared that 'no United Kingdom prime minister could 
ever agree to' as it would undermine the UK's own internal market and 
territorial integrity.72 Subsequent amendments to the UK Customs Bill in 
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July 2018, proposed by Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, ruled out a customs 
border in the Irish Sea, forcing its renegotiation.73 
Progress on future UK-EU relations continued to be impeded by on-going 
divisions within the UK cabinet on the nature of post-Brexit relations. This 
caused frustration among the EU Member States, with European leaders 
calling on the UK for 'further clarity' and 'realistic and workable proposals'.74 
Finally, in July 2018, only nine months before the UK was due to leave the EU, 
Theresa May held a meeting to try and unify her cabinet around a single vision 
for UK-EU relations. After fraught discussions, the cabinet agreed a position, 
which was then set out in a White Paper.75 The White Paper set out a vision 
of future relations based on a free trade area for goods, with the phased 
introduction of a Facilitated Customs Arrangement and a 'common 
rulebook' with the EU for goods. The Facilitated Customs Arrangement was 
based on the UK's previous proposal (tabled in August 2017 and which the 
EU had already roundly rejected) where the UK would administer two 
separate arrangements at its borders. With regard to common rules, the UK 
proposed a binding treaty commitment to continued harmonisation with EU 
rules on agri-food (but not services); continued participation in EU regulatory 
institutions; a common rulebook on state aid; cooperation on competition 
measures; and a 'non-regression' provision in areas including labour and 
environment. However, the UK was adamant that freedom of movement 
would end. The UK position was premised on being able to opt in to some 
aspects of the EU single market and out of other aspects, a position that was 
in direct contradiction to the EU's own negotiating mandate.  
Although the cabinet collectively signed up to the new position, two days 
later David Davis resigned, stating that 'the current trend of policy and 
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tactics' was making it look 'less and less likely' that the UK would leave the 
EU customs union and the single market.76 His resignation was followed by 
that of Boris Johnson and eight other ministers and senior officials who 
supported a 'hard Brexit' agreement. Outside of cabinet, the White Paper 
was criticised by MPs within the Conservative Party, particularly members of 
the Eurosceptic European Research Group, for ceding too much sovereignty. 
It was also criticised by opposition parties. The UK Labour Party argued that 
it did not resolve the problems of the Northern Ireland border and that the 
Facilitated Customs Arrangement would be a 'bureaucratic nightmare, 
unworkable, and costly for business' and reliant on 'technology that does not 
currently exist'.77  
3. The Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration (November 2018) 
Although the UK's position was unpopular at home, it nonetheless formed 
the basis of UK proposals to the EU. Theresa May pitched the UK's 
proposals at an informal meeting of EU leaders in Salzburg in September 
2018, but she proved to be a poor diplomat. She insisted that the UK 
proposals, as set out in the White Paper, were the only viable option for 
future relations and appeared to be trying to impose them on EU leaders, a 
move that only served to antagonise. Donald Tusk, European Council 
President, declared that while there were 'positive elements' in the UK's 
proposals 'the suggested framework for economic cooperation will not work. 
Not least because it risks undermining the single market [emphasis added]'.78 
The EU's flat rejection of the UK's vision for the future partnership 
reportedly 'stunned' the UK government, suggesting that the UK had a poor 
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understanding of their negotiation counterparts. Theresa May accused the 
European leaders of showing a lack of respect and declared negotiations to be 
at an 'impasse'.79 
Eventually, after a series of missed deadlines, the UK and EU reached 
agreement on 14 November 2018 on a 585-page Withdrawal Agreement that 
set out the 'divorce terms' and an accompanying 26-page Political 
Declaration which outlined the future UK-EU relationship.80 Several areas of 
the Withdrawal Agreement remained largely unchanged from the March 
2018 draft agreement, including on citizens' rights.81 New features included a 
review clause that provided for the extension of the transition period if 
agreement on future relations had not been reached within the initial 21-
months. It also provided for the use of independent arbitration to resolve 
disputes during the transition period, although matters of EU law would be 
referred to the ECJ.  
The Withdrawal Agreement included a lengthy Protocol on Northern 
Ireland, which came to be known as the 'backstop', designed to prevent the 
return of a hard border on the island of Ireland. This was ensured through a 
hybrid of two mechanisms. It had UK-wide elements, providing for the 
creation of a single customs territory between the EU and UK in the event 
that the UK and EU failed to reach an agreement on future relations by the 
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end of the transition period. It also had elements that only pertained to 
Northern Ireland, committing the region to continued harmonisation with a 
series of EU technical rules and regulations, while the rest of the UK could 
diverge from them.82   
Reflecting continuing disagreement on the nature of future UK-EU 
relations, the Political Declaration was not the substantive and detailed 
document that the UK and EU negotiators had promised. While expressing 
a high level of ambition about the nature and scope of the future relationship, 
the document only set out a series of options for the UK's future trade with 
the EU and established a framework for ongoing conversations across a range 
of areas.83 In effect, the UK and EU agreed to kick the can down the road, 
leaving the tough decisions over the nature of future relations for negotiation 
during the transition period, after the UK had left the EU.  
VI. THERESA MAY FAILS TO WIN SUPPORT AT HOME (DECEMBER 2018 – 
JUNE 2019) 
With a deal agreed between the UK and EU, it needed to be ratified in their 
respective parliaments. Prime Minister Theresa May said the deal 'delivered 
for the British people' and set the UK 'on course for a prosperous future'.84 
Yet the deal she had negotiated met strong opposition in the UK Parliament, 
and the UK was catapulted into a period of political crisis. As the two-year 
deadline imposed by Article 50 drew near, there was mounting concern that 
the UK might 'crash out' of the EU with no deal in place. Fully aware of the 
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Parliamentary arithmetic in the UK and the possibility that the Withdrawal 
Deal might be defeated in the UK Parliament, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the European Commission, cautioned that the Withdrawal Deal 
was the 'best' and 'only possible' deal.85 He warned the UK Parliament that 
the EU was not interested in renegotiating the deal, even if the UK 
Parliament wanted amendments.  
1. The Deal Is Rebuffed by the UK Parliament (1st Attempt) 
The role of the UK Parliament in the Brexit ratification process had been 
strengthened by an amendment to the EU Withdrawal Act that had passed 
in 2017, which required any Brexit deal to be enacted by statute rather than 
implemented by government order.86 This ensured that that the UK 
Parliament would be given a final 'meaningful' vote on the Withdrawal 
Agreement.  
It rapidly became clear that the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration did not have the backing of a majority of MPs in the UK 
Parliament. Given the delicate Parliamentary arithmetic, Theresa May 
needed almost all Conservative and DUP MPs on board. Yet Eurosceptic 
Conservative MPs strongly opposed the wording of the Northern Ireland 
backstop, arguing that it could permanently 'trap' the UK into a customs 
union with the EU. The backstop also crossed a red line for the DUP as it 
implied regulatory divergence and checks between Northern Ireland and the 
rest of the UK. At the other end of the political spectrum, pro-European 
Conservatives disliked the Withdrawal Agreement as it failed to ensure 
frictionless trade with the EU, while the Labour Party and smaller opposition 
parties also opposed the Agreement. 
Despite the veto power that the UK Parliament had over the negotiations, 
the government had not invested in cultivating an effective working 
relationship with MPs. MPs were deeply frustrated at the government's 
reticence to share information. Only a few days before the meaningful vote 
was scheduled, MPs found the government to be in contempt of Parliament 
for the first time in the UK's history. The vote was prompted by the 
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government's refusal to publish all of the legal advice that it had received on 
the Withdrawal Agreement, despite a legally binding Parliamentary vote 
passed in November 2018 that required it to do so.87 The DUP voted against 
the government, exposing the fragility of the government's working majority. 
In light of the strong parliamentary opposition, Theresa May withdrew the 
'meaningful vote' on the Withdrawal Agreement on 10 December 2018, one 
day before it was scheduled. She announced that the vote would be held in 
January 2019 and she would, meanwhile, seek further assurances from the EU 
about the Northern Ireland backstop.88 As before, her strategy focused on 
winning over members of the European Research Group.   
Despite EU leaders issuing a formal statement at the UK's request, it fell 
short of the legal commitment Theresa May had hoped for and failed to 
reassure Eurosceptic MPs.89 The first meaningful vote on the Withdrawal 
Agreement took place in mid-January 2019 and the government suffered the 
largest defeat of any government in modern Parliamentary history, losing by 
230 votes.90 This prompted the Labour party to table a motion of no 
confidence, which the government narrowly won.91 
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2. The Deal Is Rebuffed by the UK Parliament (2nd Attempt) 
Following the government's resounding defeat, Theresa May promised to 
change approach and be 'more flexible, open and inclusive' in engaging with 
Parliament and she held her first proper discussions with opposition parties. 
Looking to win over Labour MPs, she promised to 'embed the strongest 
possible protections on workers' rights and the environment'.92 The Labour 
Party tabled specific changes to the Political Declaration that it wanted to 
see enshrined in law to secure its support for a deal. These included a 
permanent and comprehensive UK-wide customs union; close alignment 
with the EU single market and dynamic alignment on rights and protections 
so that UK standards keep pace with evolving standards across Europe; clear 
commitments on participation in EU agencies and funding programmes, 
including in areas such as the environment, education, and industrial 
regulation; and unambiguous agreements on the detail of future security 
arrangements, including access to the European Arrest Warrant and vital 
shared databases.93  
The proposals from the Labour Party may well have been amenable to the EU 
as they did not require the renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement, and 
it is conceivable that a revised Political Declaration would have won a 
majority in the UK Parliament. Yet accepting the Labour Party's proposals 
would have alienated Eurosceptic MPs and risked splitting the Conservative 
Party, a move that Theresa May was still not prepared to make. Instead the 
prime minister adopted a strategy of 'running the clock down' hoping that, as 
the March 29 deadline for leaving the EU approached and the risk of leaving 
without a deal increased, more MPs would support the Withdrawal 
Agreement.  
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Following more talks in Brussels in early March, Theresa May secured a 
package of interpretations and clarifications on the Withdrawal Agreement 
and Political Declaration aimed at placating the Eurosceptic wing of her 
party.94 Yet these changes did not go far enough to secure a majority in 
Parliament, and the UK government lost a second meaningful vote on 12 
March 2019 by 149 votes.95 While a smaller margin than the previous 
meaningful vote, it was still a historic loss. With only two weeks to go before 
the UK was due to leave the EU, the government's negotiating strategy was 
in tatters, and the UK appeared to be without a functioning government. 
'This is a circus that is beyond comprehension' said one senior EU diplomat 
working on Brexit. Another senior Brussels figure involved in talks likened it 
to 'dealing with a failed state'.96  
With the UK government failing to show leadership, backbench MPs tried 
to exert control over the Brexit process, passing a parliamentary motion to 
reject a 'no deal' scenario.97 Theresa May sought to bring her deal back for a 
third time but, in a surprise turn of events, she was blocked by the Speaker of 
the House of Commons, on the basis of a 400-year old guide to parliamentary 
procedure, which prevented the government bringing back a motion that was 
'fundamentally the same' during the same parliamentary session.98  
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3. The UK Requests Article 50 Extension  
With the UK facing what was widely described as a constitutional crisis, 
Theresa May wrote to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council on 
20 March 2019, to ask for an extension to Article 50 until 30 June 2019. She 
argued that this would provide sufficient time for her to attain parliamentary 
support for the Withdrawal Agreement.99 
The EU agreed to extend the Article 50 deadline but rejected the UK's 
proposed extension date. Following intense internal negotiations and 
reported tensions between President Merkel of Germany and President 
Macron of France, the EU leaders offered a shorter extension period until 22 
May 2019, provided that the Withdrawal Agreement 'is approved by the 
House of Commons next week'.100 In the event that the Withdrawal 
Agreement was not approved, the European Council offered an even shorter 
extension until 12 April 2019 stating that it 'expects the United Kingdom to 
indicate a way forward before this date for consideration by the European 
Council'.101 The 12 April date was chosen as it was the last point at which the 
UK, by law, had to state whether it would participate in elections for the 
European Parliament, scheduled for May 2019.  
4. The Deal Is Rebuffed by the UK Parliament (3rd Attempt) and Theresa May Steps 
Down 
Having secured a brief respite from the EU, backbench MPs held a series of 
'indicative votes' on different Brexit scenarios to try and break the 
parliamentary deadlock. But, despite two rounds of voting, there was no 
majority for any of the options tabled.102 Meanwhile Theresa May, still 
 
99 Theresa May, 'Prime Minister's Letter to President of the European Council' (20 
March 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-
letter-to-president-tusk-20-march-2019> accessed 15 October 2019. 
100 European Council, 'European Council (Art. 50) Conclusions, 21 March 2019' (2019) 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/21/european-
council-art-50-conclusions-21-march-2019/> accessed 15 October 2019. 
101 Ibid. 
102 UK Parliament, 'House of Commons Holds Second Round of Indicative Votes' 
(www.parliament.uk, 1 April 2019) <https://www.parliament.uk/business/news 
/2019/april/house-of-commons-holds-second-round-of-indicative-votes/> 
accessed 15 October 2019. 
56 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
determined to get the Withdrawal Agreement passed rather than change her 
strategy for navigating domestic politics, found a way through parliamentary 
procedure and held a third meaningful vote on 29 March 2019 on the 
Withdrawal Agreement (without the Political Declaration). But the 
government was defeated once again.103 
With neither the UK government nor backbench MPs able to find a way 
forward, Theresa May placed the UK's fate in the hands of EU leaders, 
writing once again to Donald Tusk asking for the Article 50 deadline to be 
extended to 30 June 2019.104 EU leaders held an emergency summit on 10 
April 2019 to consider their response. After an intense debate they offered 
the UK an extension until 31 October 2019, providing the UK with six 
months to try and find a resolution to its fraught domestic politics.105  
With the date for UK exit postponed, the UK was legally obliged to 
participate in the EU elections to select new Members of the European 
Parliament. Nigel Farage, former UKIP leader, created a new political party, 
the Brexit Party, which committed to 'making sure that the UK leaves the 
EU'.106 The election results revealed the depth of political polarisation in UK 
society. The staunchly Eurosceptic Brexit Party won with just over 30 per 
cent of the vote share, giving it 29 of the UK's 73 allocated MEPs, while the 
staunchly pro-European Liberal Democrats came second, winning twenty 
per cent of the vote share and 16 MEPs. The two main parties performed very 
poorly, with the Labour Party winning 14 per cent of the vote share and the 
Conservative Party only nine per cent, placing it in fifth place behind the 
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Green Party.107 This was the  Conservative Party's worst ever result in a 
national election since the party was founded in 1834. Theresa May stepped 
down as party leader in early June 2019. 
VII. CONCLUSION: FAILURE TO BROKER DOMESTIC COALITIONS 
The UK government's Brexit negotiating strategy was surprisingly weak 
given its strong civil service and cadre of experienced diplomats. This article 
has shown how Theresa May's government embarked on negotiations with 
other EU countries without a clear set of negotiating objectives; was unable 
to represent itself as a unified negotiating team; often found itself on the back 
foot, responding to EU proposals on both sequencing and content; and its 
UK politicians pursued an ill-judged distributive strategy that did not reflect 
the nature of the underlying negotiating problem or the UK's relative power 
position.  
I have argued that these weaknesses can be attributed to continued divisions 
within the UK, and the failure of Theresa May to broker agreement within 
her cabinet and forge a majority coalition in the UK Parliament. The failure 
of cabinet to agree a common position resulted in the UK negotiating 
without a clear set of objectives and this lack of political direction generated 
tensions within the UK negotiating team. In turn, this enabled the EU to 
seize the initiative in the negotiations and decisively shape the outcome.  
At the level of parliamentary politics, it is striking that Theresa May decided 
not to try and forge a cross-party coalition for the Brexit negotiations from 
the outset, despite presiding over a minority government and facing deep 
splits within her own party. Given these constraints, a cross-party approach 
to the negotiations provided the best prospects for negotiating a deal that 
could be ratified. The Labour Party's proposals in February 2019 suggest that 
relatively minor amendments to the Political Declaration, including a 
credible commitment to the UK remaining in a customs union and aligning 
with the EU single market, could have yielded a parliamentary majority. Yet 
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forging a cross-party coalition in Parliament risked splitting the Conservative 
Party, a move that Theresa May was unwilling to take.  
Would a different leader have fared any better? It is tempting to attribute 
faults in the UK strategy to Theresa May's weaknesses as a politician. Yet 
even the most astute politician would have faced major challenges in trying to 
forge a cross-party coalition. The winner-takes-all logic of the UK's electoral 
system is a formidable barrier to collaboration between the two dominant 
political parties, even when such collaboration is in the national interest. 
 
